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Zen and the Art of Treason: Radical Buddhism in Meiji Era
(1868–1912) Japan
JAMES MARK SHIELDSa,b∗
aBucknell University; bInternational Research Center for Japanese Studies
ABSTRACT In the early decades of the twentieth century, as Japanese society became engulfed
in war and increasing nationalism, the majority of Buddhist leaders and institutions capitulated
to the status quo. At the same time, there was a stream of ‘resistance’ among a few Buddhist
figures, both priests and laity. These instances of progressive and ‘radical Buddhism’ had
roots in late Edo-period peasant revolts, the lingering discourse of early Meiji period liberalism,
trends within Buddhist reform and modernisation and the emergence in the first decade of the
twentieth century of radical political thought, including various forms of socialism and anar-
chism. This essay analyses the roots of ‘radical Buddhism’ in Japan by analysing the life and
work of three distinctive figures: Tarui To¯kichi (1850–1922), Takagi Kenmyo¯ (1864–1914),
and Uchiyama Gudo¯ (1874–1911). While noting their differences, I argue these three collective
represent both the problems and possibilities of radical Buddhism in an East Asian and specifi-
cally Japanese context.
Modern socialism is a product and a critique of capitalism, but not necessarily of
industrialization. [ . . . ] No society, Japan’s included, that has tried to industrialize
in the capitalist mode has failed to generate an indigenous socialist movement.
[ . . . ] In their formative years, they draw on their predecessor and contemporary
movements for models of discourse, organization, and action. At the same time, as
an indigenous movement, socialism naturally and inevitably borrows traditional
(pre-capitalist) sentiments, concepts, practices, and protocols of social criticism
and protest, which then are selectively assimilated into and help define the par-
ticular national variant of ‘socialism’.1
In the final decade of the Meiji Period, several events played a significant role in
shaping Japanese attitudes towards progressive social activism – and ‘socialism’ in
particular. The first of these was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. Although on
one level the war helped to reignite the patriotic fervour that had swept the nation a
decade previous with Japan’s defeat of China, its aftermath also saw a dramatic
increase in urban social disruption – typified by the Hibiya Riots of 1905, during mobs
in Tokyo expressed their anger over the ‘unfair’ Portsmouth Treaty, signed to end the
∗Email: james.shields@bucknell.edu
1William Theodore De Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur Tiedemann (eds) Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2: 1600
to 2000, Part 2: 1868 to 2000, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 212–213.
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conflict.2 The spectre of social discord as an inevitable ‘excrescence of civilisation’ (bunmei-
byo¯) had been raised since the 1880s, and now it seemed that the worst fears of conservative
ministers and ideologues were coming to pass. In response, the government sought ways to
both forestall the more sporadic forms of protest and social activism by implementing ‘pre-
ventive’ social policies, while at the same time suppressing the emergence of organised
socialism – which they (influenced by European leaders) considered little more than a
pretext for chaos and anarchy. There was already precedent for the suppression of
socialist organisations in the name of public harmony. In 1900 the government invoked
the Public Order and Police Law (which would become the Public Order Preservation
Law of early Sho¯wa) to ban the fledgling Social Democratic Party just two days after it
was established.
Things only got worse, in the government’s eyes, in 1906, with riots (again in Tokyo)
against a rise in streetcar fares, followed by a rash of strikes throughout the country in
the following year. The root cause of these disturbances was not in itself hard to diagnose:
the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation that had been taking place since 1900, and
which would continue throughout the end of World War I. Another factor, however, fre-
quently noted by both the press and those in power was the spread of education, which had
created a class of ‘educated unemployed idlers’.3 An organised socialist movement emerged
in the years following the Russo-Japanese War, organising strikes and occasional anti-
government demonstrations. After the Red Flag Incident (akahata jiken) of 1908 and the
High Treason Incident (taigyaku jiken) of 1910–1911, the government made further
moves to eliminate the ‘plague’ (yakubyo¯) of what one top official, Yamagata Aritomo
(1838–1922), called ‘social destructionism’ (shakaihakaishugi).4 In this context, it may
come as something of a surprise to realise that a few Buddhists risked life and limb in
order to proclaim affiliation with progressive and radical political movements, including
socialism and anarchism. And yet this is precisely what happened. In what follows I
outline the thought and activities of several of these ‘radical Buddhists’, while providing
a historical and theoretical context in which to better understand both their lives and work.
Early Hints of Buddhist(ic) Socialism: The Eastern Socialist Party
While individuals and movements self-consciously advocating ‘Buddhist socialism’ only
appear in the late Meiji period, germs of the idea can be traced back to the writings of a
few scholars and social activists of the 1880s. One example is the Eastern (or Oriental)
Socialist Party (To¯yo¯ Shakaito¯), founded by Tarui To¯kichi (1850–1922) in 1882.
Though the party was short-lived – setting a precedent for left-wing parties over the
next 50 years in being forcibly suppressed by the government within months of its incep-
tion – the writings of Tarui and other founding members were, for their day, quite radical,
and reveal the tensions of attempting to ‘change the world’ while remaining true to their
cultural (and religious) roots.
The draft of the party’s regulations, written by Tarui, contains 17 articles, along with a
number of smaller clauses. The first three articles make up the three basic principles on
which the To¯yo¯ Shakaito¯ was founded:
2Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1991), p. 1.
3Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), p. 177.
4Yamagata Aritomo, ‘Shakaihakaishugiron’ in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho (Tokyo: Hara sho¯bo¯, 1966), pp. 315–
316.
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1. We will make sincere love (shin-ai) the criterion for our words and actions.
2. We will stand on the principle of equality of self and other ( jita byo¯do¯).
3. Our aim is the greatest welfare (saidai fukuri) for the general public.5
Here we can see, in addition to general (if vague) ‘socialist’ principles, an explicit link to
Buddhist doctrine. The term jita byo¯do¯, used here to express a call for social and economic
quality, is a traditional Buddhist term meaning ‘equality of self and other in their original
nature’ (Sk. a¯tma-para-samata¯).6 These three founding principles are followed by Article 4,
which provides four ‘measures’ (shudan) by means of which the party intends to ‘remedy
the corrupt practices of the past and destroy the heritage of divisions between rich and
poor’: (1) communal ownership of property (tenbutsu or tenmotsu kyo¯yu¯); (2) a cooperative
society (kyo¯do¯ shakai); (3) women’s education; and (4) population control.7 Although the
ideals presented would be familiar to most European socialists of the day, the specific terms
employed are distinctly Buddhist – or at least East Asian in derivation. For instance, the
tenmotsu in tenmotsu kyo¯yu¯ is a traditional Buddhist term meaning ‘all the living things
in the world’ – though in a non-Buddhist context (as tenbutsu) it can simply imply ‘all
things under heaven’.8 While it seems likely that Tarui had in mind Herbert Spencer’s argu-
ment against private property in terms of land, here as elsewhere he takes pains to frame the
issue in familiar East Asian terminology rather than resort to neologisms or loan words.9
Article 5 provides the four ways in which the party intends to expand its message: per-
sonal study; speeches; campaigns; books, newspapers, and magazines. Next, Articles 6 and 7
give the party’s ‘oath’ (meiyaku), which includes a reiteration of the party’s official name,
and opens up to a rather lengthy discourse on their ideals, including explicit links to Bud-
dhist and Daoist doctrine. First, Tarui asserts that the Eastern Socialist Party aligns itself
squarely with the ‘tendencies of oriental civilisation’, upon which foundation they will
be able to ‘come together with common heart and mind’ to create ‘great clouds that will
rain down the blessings of equality upon society’. Of note here is the metaphor of
‘clouds and rain’: suiten no kumo to nari ichimi no ame to nari. Within this phrase one
finds the four-character set: , which comes directly from the ‘Parable of Medicinal
Herbs’ section of the Lotus Sutra, where it refers to the universality of the Buddha’s teaching
(more specifically of the One Law of the Lotus Sutra) and the power of such to lift all beings
without exception towards buddhahood.10 Tarui further writes that as ‘children of the
Buddha’ (busshi), party members have a special mandate to look upon the people with
compassion. The remaining 10 articles further emphasise the moral foundations and ‘indo-
mitable spirit’ of the party, as well as their openness to various measures on the basis of the
Buddhist doctrine of ho¯ben or skilful means (Sk. upa¯ya).11
Even at this early stage, we see several of the tensions that would haunt such experiments
in progressive Buddhism over the next several decades. First was the natural but difficult-
to-sustain attempt to ‘indigenise’ socialism by appealing to traditional Asian concepts and
ideas; second was the appeal to the East Asian values of peace and harmony, which were
5Tarui Tokichi, ‘To¯yo¯ no kyomuto¯’ in Itoya Hisao and Kishimoto Eitaro¯ (eds) Nihon shakai undo¯ shisho¯ shi, vol. 2
(Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1968), p. 129.
6Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v., jita byo¯do¯.
7Tarui, op. cit., p. 130.
8Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v., tenmotsu.
9Spencer discourses on this topic in chapter 9 of his Social Statics (1851), ‘The Right to the Use of the Earth’, a work
that would have tremendous influence on both modern China and Japan; see Akamatsu Katsumaro, Nihon shakai
undo¯ shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1952), p. 11.
10T0262.09.0020b18–b19.
11Tarui, op. cit., pp. 130–132.
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frequently accompanied, among early socialists, with an appeal to the Emperor as benevo-
lent protector of the social welfare of the Japanese people. In a public lecture delivered in
Nagasaki in January 1882 on the theme of ‘Oriental Nihilism’ (To¯yo¯ no Kyomuto¯), Tarui
invoked the recent assassination of Russia’s Tsar Alexander II to warn that the spectre of
nihilism could also reach the shores of Japan. Though he denounced the nihilists for
their infernal crime of regicide, he appealed to the leaders of Japan to effect transformative
change to relieve the people of their present conditions of oppression (by the Meiji state, of
course, not the Emperor).12 In the same speech Tarui makes a differentiation between
‘nihilism’ and both Daoist and Buddhist doctrines of ‘nothingness’ (kyomu). As far as Bud-
dhism goes:
Among S´a¯kyamuni’s teachings are both exoteric teachings, such as the excessive
stories of heaven and hell, and esoteric, hidden ones, which is where we can
find the doctrine that all is nothingness. To take one or two examples, all meritor-
ious practices are said to be directed towards a blissful realization of imperma-
nence. Also, the central point of the teaching that ‘form is nothing other than
emptiness, and emptiness nothing other than form’ is one we must take heart.
Thus, when we compare the use of the same word kyomu by both Western nihilists
and our forefathers in China and India, we find that there is in fact no similarity
whatsoever.
As Akamatsu Katsumaro would later write, the To¯yo¯ Shakaito¯ ‘was not based on Western
socialism [but rather] espoused a peculiar socialist blend of traditional Asian Buddhism and
Taoism’.13 Of this there is little doubt, but does this mean that Tarui and the members of
To¯yo¯ Shakaito¯ were not ‘actually’ socialists? This, of course, is a normative question, depen-
dent on one’s specific understanding of ‘socialism’, but it is one that most later socialists
and scholars would come to answer in the affirmative, due, in large part, to the lack of a
sophisticated economic analysis and a heavy reliance on traditional religious terms and
ideals.
At about the same that Tarui To¯kichi was developing his ideas for social renovation,
Katayama Sen (1859–1933) began promoting a ‘spiritual socialism’ similarly founded on
religious ideals. Though Katayama (born Yabuki Sugataro¯) relied more directly on Chris-
tianity than Buddhism, and eventually moved towards a more secular form of socialism and
communism (he would help found the Japanese Communist Party in 1922), he never
renounced his early conviction – developed while studying at various universities in the
United States in the late 1880s and early 1890s – that religious values were crucial in devel-
oping personal character, and that such character was itself essential to the construction of
community. This theme is one that would be picked up by later Buddhist socialists. Against
the Marxian interpretation of religion, Katayama saw churches in America at the forefront
of social welfare, and a bulwark against secular commercialism.14
While the early Sho¯wa-era scholar Tanaka So¯goro¯ (1894–1961) viewed socialism as a
mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and Western ideas, others have felt that the Maha¯ya¯na
12Akamatsu Katsumaro, ‘The Russian Influence on the Early Japanese Social Movement’ in Peter Bergen, Paul
F. Langer, and George O. Totten (eds) The Russian Impact on Japan–Literature and Social Thought (Los
Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1981), p. 91. Akamatsu adds: ‘I believe that the progressive intel-
lectuals of Japan in his day were generally more or less of the same opinion’.
13Ibid., p. 91.
14Sawada Mitziko, Tokyo Life, New York Dreams: Urban Japanese Visions of America, 1890–1924 (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1996), p. 134.
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insistence on compassion was enough to render the Buddhist traditions of East Asia quasi-
socialist in nature. Though most of the New Buddhists were resistant to socialism, a few,
such as Mo¯ri Saian (1872–1938), were sympathetic to the Commoner’s Society (Heimin-
sha), a labour union formed in 1901.15 The final years of the Meiji period saw a turn
towards Buddhist socialism in the writings of Shin priest Takagi Kenmyo¯ (1864–1914)
– for whom socialism was ‘much more deeply related to religion than to politics’16 –
and, most dramatically, in the famous case of Uchiyama Gudo¯ (1874–1911), the So¯to¯
Zen priest who protested against rural poverty as ‘unjust and anti-Buddhist’, and, as a
result, was arrested (along with Takagi) and executed on trumped-up charges of plotting
to assassinate the Emperor in what is known as the High Treason Incident.17 Even the writ-
ings of the Shin sect reformer Kiyozawa Manshi – whose Spiritual Activism comes under
criticism from progressive Buddhists – contain hints of utopian socialism, in his references
to a ‘Buddhist country’ (nyorai no kokka) that might one day replace the present capitalistic
and materialistic one.
These experiments in progressive Buddhism are particularly striking given the growing
social conservatism from the late Meiji period, as well as the general scepticism with which
socialist movements have been viewed by Buddhists in Japan and elsewhere. Traditional
Buddhist teachings of karma have long been used to both explain and inevitably to
justify social inequalities, and Japan is no exception to this rule. Buddhist Enlightenment
figure Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) – though lauded by progressives for his stand in
favour of freedom of religion and the separation of church and state – was neither the
first or last to blame poverty on the laziness and general moral laxity of the poor.18 More-
over, for all its emphasis on compassion, East Asian Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism has a quietist
side, due in part to the assimilation of Confucian political ideals (including harmony
and hierarchy) as well as interpretations of more arcane philosophical teachings such as
no-self and emptiness (which have been explored in some detail by the recent Critical Bud-
dhist movement). Ironically, given the emphasis on interdependence and mutual interpe-
netration that one finds in East Asian Maha¯ya¯na thought (especially the influential Kegon,
Tendai and Zen schools), East Asian Buddhists have rarely used these concepts to support a
critique of structural inequalities and systems of oppression, focusing instead on ‘private’
acts of sin and vice. Finally, we should note that, in addition to traditional Buddhist scepti-
cism towards socialist ‘materialism’ and ‘individualism’, another factor that hampers the
development of Buddhist socialism in any context is the residual anti-religious aspect of
Marxist versions of socialism (this has also been an issue with experiments in Christian
socialism and liberation theology). This anti-religious sentiment began to grow significantly
in Japan in the early 1930s, with the birth of a full-fledged han-shu¯kyo¯ movement.
At the theoretical level, Ichikawa Hakugen has explored the various problems with ‘Bud-
dhist socialism’ in the Japanese context. In a chapter devoted to this subject towards the end
15See O¯ko¯chi Kazuo and and Matsuo Hiroshi, Nihon Rodo Kumiai Monogatari (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1965),
pp. 159–162, for a description of demonstrations organised by Heiminsha on 2 April 1901, during which protes-
ters massed in various areas of Tokyo to carry banners and shout slogans proclaiming the adherence to socialism.
16Takagi Kenmyo¯, Yo ga shakashugi [My Socialism], trans. Robert Rhodes, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, 33:2
(2002), p. 55.
17See Winston Davis, Japanese Religion and Society: Paradigms of Structure and Change (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992),
pp. 169–170; Brian Victoria, Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill, 1997), pp. 66–73; Ishikawa Rikizan, ‘The Social
Response of Buddhists to the Modernization of Japan: The Contrasting Lives of Two So¯to¯ Zen Monks’, Japanese
Journal of Religious Studies, 25 (1998), pp. 87–115; Brian Victoria, Zen War Stories (London: Routledge Curzon,
2003), pp. 204–207; see Wagatsuma Sakae (ed), Nihon seiji saiban kiroku: Meiji, go (Tokyo: Daiichi Ho¯ki), for a
record of the High Treason Incident.
18Davis, op. cit., p. 177, n. 53.
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of The War Responsibility of Buddhists (Bukkyo¯sha no senso¯ sekinin, 1970), Ichikawa notes as
many as 12 specific factors that hinder the emergence of a full Japanese Buddhist socialism:
(1) Close (i.e., mutually supportive) relations between Buddhism and the state;
(2) Buddhist views of the human and society, especially via karma (see above);
(3) ‘Confucian’ ethics of hierarchy, loyalty and harmony;
(4) Doctrines like no-self, which inhibit reflection on justice and human rights;
(5) The Buddhist ‘ethics of feeling’ (instead of an ‘ethics of responsibility’);
(6) The philosophy of repayment of debt/blessings (on);
(7) The theory of interdependence, which subverts political criticism;
(8) The doctrine of the Middle Way, which leads to political compromise;
(9) Ancestor worship, which promotes nationalism via a ‘family-state’;
(10) Reverence for the aged, and by extension, for old things (wabi, and so on);
(11) Buddhist/Zen emphasis on ‘peace of mind’ (anshin) over justice;
(12) The logic of soku or soku/hi (yes/no), which affirms the status quo.19
These ‘problems’ overlap with Ichikawa’s more general argument regarding the ethical
failure of Buddhism – more particularly Zen – in confronting militarism during the early
twentieth century. In other words, for Ichikawa, the failure of the development of Buddhist
socialism is part and parcel of the ‘failure’ of modern Japanese Buddhism more generally.
Upon inspection, these 12 items can be divided neatly into two categories: (1) deeply
embedded features of Japanese and East Asian culture – including religious syncretism:
i.e., 1, 3, 6, 9, 10; and (2) Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist doctrines, most of which go back many cen-
turies, and have been subject to a large variety of interpretation: i.e., 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12. While
a number of recent critics have focused on the various doctrinal ‘causes’ for Buddhist com-
plicity in modern Japanese nationalism, I am inclined towards Ives’s argument that it is the
first category of Ichikawa’s factors – i.e., general features of Japanese culture and religion, of
which we might include a tendency towards institutional conservatism – that are primarily
‘responsible’ for the rejection of progressive forms of Buddhism and subsequent develop-
ment of Imperial Way Buddhism.20 After all, with respect to doctrine, there is always the
possibility of reinterpretation – a practice that new and progressive Buddhists put to good
use. It is much harder to fight against deeply ingrained cultural values and practices.
With the background sketched above and Ichikawa’s parameters in mind, the rest of this
essay provides a comparative and contextual analysis of the thought of the two most signifi-
cant radical Buddhist priests of the late Meiji period: Takagi Kenmyo¯ and Uchiyama Gudo¯.
Takagi Kenmyo¯: (Buddhist) Socialism as Faith and Practice
Takagi Kenmyo¯ (1864–1914) may well be the first Japanese Buddhist priest to explicitly
and publicly embrace socialism (shakaishugi) – albeit while insisting that it was simply
an expression of his personal faith and not a scientific doctrine he had any interest in
spreading throughout Japan or the world.21 Born and raised in Aichi prefecture, Takagi
19Ichikawa Hakugen, Bukkyo¯sha no senso¯ sekinin (Tokyo: Shunshu¯sha, 1970), pp. 150–154; also see Christoper
Ives, Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics (Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press), pp. 55–56.
20Ives develops this argument – against Brian Victoria (Zen at War, Zen War Stories), but also, to some extent,
against Ichikawa himself – in chapter 4 of his Imperial-Way Zen, pp. 101–127.
21Takagi, op. cit., p. 54; in the following discussion of Yo ga shakaishugi I have used Robert Rhodes’s translation,
while adding fragments from the original Japanese as necessary.
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entered the Shin (Higashi Honganji) priesthood, becoming head priest of Jo¯senji in
Wakayama prefecture in 1899, at age 35. It so happened that a large number of his parishi-
oners were burakumin, and thus faced the combined suffering of economic hardship and
social discrimination. The burakumin problem would become the driving force behind
Takagi’s ‘conversion’ to social activism and associations with secular socialists – associ-
ations that would eventually cost him his life. On 18 January 1911, Takagi was charged
with ‘high treason’ for his alleged complicity in a plot to assassinate the Meiji Emperor,
and was sentenced to death along with 25 others, including three fellow Buddhist
priests, all in their 20 s or 30 s – Uchiyama Gudo¯ (So¯to¯ Zen), Sasaki Do¯gen (Shin,
1889–1916), Mineo Setsudo (Rinzai Zen, 1885–1919) – along with a Christian doctor,
O¯ishi Seinosuke (1867–1911). While 12 (including Gudo¯) were summarily executed,
Takagi’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He died in prison on 24 June
1914, at the age of 51, apparently by suicide. Defrocked by Higashi Honganji on the date
of his sentencing in 1911, Takagi’s life and work were re-evaluated during the postwar
Shin O¯tani-ha sect reforms; and in 1996, 82 years after his death, he was fully reinstated
by the denomination. As Ama notes, Higashi Honganji went so far as to claim for
Takagi a guiding role in their future work towards social reform.22
In Yo ga shakaishugi (My Socialism), written in 1904 on the eve of the Russo-Japanese
War but unpublished until 1959, Takagi outlines his hybrid vision, which, he says, he
intends to ‘put into practice’ despite the fact that it may inspire laughter and derision
among his readers. From these brief prefatory remarks we can see that Takagi’s socialism
is understood primarily as a tool for character transformation, which, it is implied, will lead
to social transformation through good works – as such, he sees socialism in very much the
way that New Buddhists and other late-Meiji progressives understood Buddhist liberation,
and unlike the more radical visions of Buddhist socialism expressed in the Taisho¯ and early
Sho¯wa periods. This is not to suggest that Takagi was uninterested in social transformation,
but simply that his vision was amelioristic and reformist rather than revolutionary.
Along these same lines, it is also of note that Takagi immediately disavows links not only
with the work of Marx and Tolstoy (perhaps the two most significant foreign influences on
late-Meiji Japanese socialism) but also with a number of the major left-wing figures of the
day: Katayama Sen (see above), Sakai Toshihiko (Kosen, 1871–1933), and Ko¯toku Denjiro¯
(Shu¯sui, 1871–1911), the radical journalist and father of Japanese anarchism who would
later be charged with leading the plot to assassinate the emperor and executed during
the High Treason Incident.23 While Katayama was sympathetic to religious forms of social-
ism, Sakai and Ko¯toku represent the more radical and explicitly anti-religious extreme of
the various left-wing movements of the day. Ko¯toku’s final work, Kirisuto Massatsuron,
was a blistering critique of the myth of Jesus Christ, while Sakai would go on to
co-found the anti-religious Nihon Hanshu¯kyo¯ Do¯mei (Japan Anti-Religion Alliance).24
22Ama Toshimaru, ‘Towards a Shin Buddhist Social Ethics’, Eastern Buddhist, New Series, 33:2 (2001), p. 49.
23In November 1903, along with Sakai Toshihiko, Ko¯to¯ku founded the short-lived but influential radical newspa-
per Heimin Shimbun (The Commoner’s Newspaper), the mouthpiece of the Heimin-sha (Commoners’ Society).
Sakai and Ko¯to¯ku were also responsible for the first Japanese translation of The Communist Manifesto. After
reading the work of Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) in prison, Ko¯to¯ku would renounce
Marxian socialism for ‘radical anarchism’, eventually corresponding with Kropotkin and translating the latter’s
Conquest of Bread in 1909. See Frederick G. Notehelfer, Ko¯toku Shu¯sui, Portrait of a Japanese Radical
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
24As anarchist O¯sugi Sakae (1885–1923) relates in his autobiography, among the four acknowledged leaders of the
Commoner’s Society – Ko¯to¯ku, Sakai, Nishikawa Ko¯jiro¯ (1876–1940) and Ishikawa Sanshiro¯ (1876–1956) – only
the last ‘did not despise religion’; O¯sugi Sakae, The Autobiography of O¯sugi Sakae, trans. Byron K. Marshall (Ber-
keley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 121–122.
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As a priest within the Pure Land Shin sect, Takagi was exposed to the significant changes
happening as part of the Higashi Honganji reforms of the 1890s and early 1900s, including
the work of Kiyozawa Manshi, just one year Takagi’s senior. Like Kiyozawa, Takagi envi-
sioned social change arising from a process of individual transformation, based on a refor-
mulation of the traditional Shin Buddhist concept of shinjin – usually translated as ‘faith’
but with the nuance of ‘opening oneself up’ to the saving grace of Other-power.25 Unlike
Kiyozawa, however, Takagi was primarily an activist rather than a scholar, and thus war-
rants the label given him by Alfred Bloom as ‘an early engaged Buddhist’.26 At the same
time, unlike most radical and progressive Buddhists of early twentieth-century Japan,
Takagi chose to remain a monk; though, as noted, his ordination was rescinded by the
Shin sect upon his arrest.
As with the later Buddhist socialist Seno’o Giro¯ (1889–1961), Takagi envisions socialism
as a ‘kind of practice’ (isshu no jissenho¯ de aru) – i.e., as the first step towards reform, rather
than simply a call for reform. And yet, as noted above, he sees socialism primarily as a form
of existential transformation rather than a theory of politics: ‘In proceeding to reform
society, we have to, first of all, begin from our own spirituality’. This move allows
Takagi to found his socialism in traditional Pure Land Buddhist principles, such as the nem-
butsu prayer: Namu Amida Butsu, which acts as a kind of external guiding force or light.
While the power of the nembutsu is open to all, it shows a preferential option, we might
say, for the poor and oppressed, for ‘Amida’s main concern is for the common people’.
Takagi’s traditional reliance on tariki or ‘Other-power’ is a far cry from the this-worldly
tone of not only later Buddhist socialists, but even many earlier Buddhist modernists.
Unlike these other Buddhist reformers, Takagi clearly believed that the best bulwark
against selfishness and injustice is to maintain an external standard (i.e., Amida), represent-
ing ‘the absolute transcendental compassion’. 27
And yet, like many other progressive Buddhists, Takagi simultaneously reaffirms and
reinterprets the foundational Buddhist idea of the Three Refuges, Jewels or Treasures:
Buddha, Dharma and Sangha (though he avoids using these terms). While Dharma or
what he calls ‘doctrine’ (kyo¯gi) is encapsulated in the Amida’s Vow of compassion,
which is turn evoked by practitioners through the nembutsu prayer, Takagi replaces the
term ‘Buddha’ with ninshi – literally, ‘teacher of human beings’ – which also represents
his ‘ideal person’. While S´a¯kyamuni is of course the first and most outstanding example
of such, the emphasis is on his life as a supporter of the poor and suffering, rather than
as a figure of worship or reverence.28 Takagi’s words here bear quoting, since they get to
25In the words of Shinran (1173–1262): ‘[H]owever precious a treasure one may offer before the Buddha or give to
a teacher, it is meaningless if one lacks shinjin. And even though one may not make a donation of even a single
sheet of paper or half a penny to the sangha, if one yields one’s heart to Other Power and one’s shinjin is deep,
one is in accord with the essential intent of the Vow’; Shinran, The Collected Works of Shinran, vol. 1 (Kyoto:
Jo¯do Shinshu¯ Hongwanji-ha, 1997), p. 677; see Ugo Dessı`, ‘Introduction: Shin Buddhism and Japanese Society’
in Ugo Dessı` (ed) The Social Dimension of Shin Buddhism (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 4.
26Alfred Bloom (ed.) Living in Amida’s Universal Vow: Essays in Shin Buddhism (Bloomington: World Vision,
2004), p. 23.
27Takagi, op. cit., p. 55.
28The emphasis on the ‘human’ Buddha had become a standard trope in Japanese Buddhist modernism from the
early Meiji period; see Judith Snodgrass, Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and
the Columbian Exposition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 97–102, for discussion of
this emphasis within nineteenth-century Western scholarship on Buddhism, dating back at least to R. Spence
Hardy’s Eastern Monachism (1850) and Sir James Emerson Tennent’s Christianity in Ceylon (1850); though, as
Snodgrass notes, Hardy and some other early Western scholars (though not Tennent) employed this as part of
a critique of Buddhism (and the Buddha) as being ‘uninspired’ and thus insufficient as a solid basis for morality
or religion: ‘atheistic in ideal and idolatrous in practice’ (p. 99).
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the tensions inherent in the anachronistic attempt to affirm that Buddhism – or any
ancient religious tradition – is, at heart, ‘socialist’.29
Each of his [i.e., S´a¯kyamuni’s] words and phrases reflects his theory of individu-
alism. But what about his life? Casting away his royal rank, he became a mendicant
monk, all for the purpose of removing suffering and giving happiness to people.
He spent his entire life with only three robes and a begging bowl, and died under
the bodhi tree. [ . . . ] Wasn’t he a great socialist of the spiritual realm? (Though his
socialism is not identical in theory with that of the Heiminsha or that of the fol-
lowers of Chokugen.) He thought little of social rank or status. He reformed part of
the social system of the time. Indeed, there is no question that he succeeded in
changing a number of things.30
Here Takagi takes pains to emphasise that, while S´a¯kyamuni – and by extension, Bud-
dhism – is certainly socialistic, it is not ‘identical in theory’ with modern forms of socialism,
such as that of the Commoner’s Society or the left-wing newspaper Chokugen (Straight
Talk). Takagi fails to explain the nature of the difference, which might have to do with
the radically different historical, socio-economic and cultural context, but perhaps, more
importantly, relates back to Takagi’s reference to the Buddha’s ‘individualism’, and
which we might take to refer more generally to his focus on personal transformation as
the primary goal of both Buddhism and socialism.
Takagi cites the existence of many ninshi following S´a¯kyamuni, including the founders of
several of the major Buddhist sects in Japan (excepting the Zen and Nichiren sects, though
the antinomian Rinzai Zen monk Ikkyu¯ is included in the list). All of these ninshi ‘reserved
their deepest sympathy for the common people’. Unsurprisingly, given his sectarian affilia-
tion, Takagi notes the particular dedication to social welfare of Shin sect founder Shinran
(1173–1262), who was, ‘without a doubt, a socialist who realised a life of non-discrimi-
nation in the spiritual realm’.31 Here, again, however, Takagi adds a quick parenthetical
coda – ‘(However, even this is different from the theory of present-day socialists)’ –
which we might once again interpret as a way of suggesting a lack in contemporary
(secular) socialism, one that may have to do with their inability or unwillingness to con-
ceive of a realm beyond the material. At any rate, it at this point in the essay that Takagi
makes his central claim: ‘I declare Buddhism to be the mother of the common people
and the enemy of the nobility’.32
And yet, to this point in his discourse Takagi has yet to discuss the third – and to some
extent always the most problematic for Buddhist modernists – of the Three Jewels. Here, as
with virtually all modernists and progressives, sangha is broadened to mean not the mon-
astic community but society, if not humanity, at large. Yet Takagi’s interpretation is
unusual in being, like his discussion of Dharma or doctrine, so deeply embedded in specifi-
cally Pure Land teachings. For Takagi, sangha means not simply society but the ‘ideal world’
(riso¯ sekai de aru) – i.e., the Pure Land. Traditionally understood as a paradisiacal realm
reached after death, and the only place in which the Dharma can be actually practiced,
Takagi substitutes socialism for Dharma here, suggesting that ‘the Land of Bliss is the
place in which socialism is truly practiced’. Here it would seem clear that Takagi believes
in the Pure Land as an actual realm (as opposed to simply a metaphor, existential condition,
29Takagi, op. cit., p. 56.
30Takagi, op. cit., p. 56.
31Cf. Dessı`, op. cit., p. 243.
32Takagi, op. cit., pp. 56–57.
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or ideal of a future society). At the same time, however, he emphasises: (1) the fundamental
equality of all beings in the Pure Land (from novice bodhisattvas to Amida himself); and (2)
the fact that beings in the Pure Land awaken to the ‘Buddha mind [or] the mind of great
compassion’, which prompts them to ‘fly to other lands to save people to whom they are
karmically related’. In other words, Takagi’s Pure Land acts not only as a heavenly model
and guide for those of us remaining in the fallen world; it is also a place where beings are
able to act on their fundamental reorientation towards compassion by engaging with this
world of suffering.33
We have never heard that beings in the Land of Bliss have attacked other lands.
Nor have we ever heard that they have started a great war for the sake of
justice. Hence I am against war [with Russia]. I do not feel that a person of the
Land of Bliss should take part in warfare. (However, there may be those,
among the socialists, who advocate the opening of war.) (This refers to Mori
Saian.)34
Another issue that bedevils Buddhist modernists is the question of faith, both what this
implies in a modern, scientific age, and what it means within Buddhist tradition. As a Pure
Land Buddhist, Takagi has less reservation in affirming the centrality of faith (shinko¯) than
some of his modernist peers, but he once again reformulates the concept in line with his
socialist principles. For instance, he defines faith in terms of a ‘revolution [or turning]
of thought’ (shiso¯ no kaiten) – i.e., a form of personal transformation that is founded in
the practice of social welfare. And yet, the traditional Pure Land teaching that we are
living in a degenerate age of the end of the law (mappo¯) is also reaffirmed, with an under-
standing that this condition is a result of social injustice and economic oppression rather
than a result of karmic fruits or some form of cosmological determinism. ‘We live in a
country where the common people in general are sacrificed for the fame, peerage and
medals of one small group of people . . . This is truly a world of defilement, a world of suf-
fering, a dark night. Human nature is being slaughtered by the devil’.35
As the final line indicates, although our present fallen state is a result of human greed and
desire, it has implications that are deeper than simply the material; human nature –
literally, the ‘true nature or humanity’ – is at stake. The only way to avoid this destruction
is to ‘open ourselves up (tainin) to the Tathagata’s mind of compassion’ – which implies a
commitment to practice, meaning social engagement. And this, Takagi insists, has nothing
whatsoever to do with social status or prestigious awards: ‘we do not wish to become reci-
pients of the Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum, general or noblemen like them. We are
not labouring in order to become such people’. Here Takagi provides a succinct statement
of his attempt to fuse the material and spiritual as well as the individual and social realms:
‘The only thing I wish to accomplish through my great energy and human labor is progress
(ko¯jo¯ shinpo) and community life (kyo¯do¯ seikatsu). We labor in order to produce and we
cultivate our minds so that we can attain the Way’.36 Takagi’s conclusion, which echoes
in many ways the manifesto of his New Buddhist peers, calls for a focus on the nembutsu,
33Ibid., pp. 57–58.
34Ibid., p. 58; Mo¯ri Saian (1872–1938), Shingon priest, journalist and publisher of the socialist newspaper Muro¯
shinpo¯, founded in 1900. A member of the New Buddhist Fellowship, Mo¯ri was arrested and jailed at one point for
slandering an official.
35Ibid, pp. 58–59.
36Ibid., p. 59; Takagi’s language here, as radical as it may have sounded at the time, echoes the contemporary Con-
stitution of the Shinshu¯ O¯tani-ha, which states the goal of the sect as nothing less than the ‘actualisation’ of a
‘society based on [Buddhist] fellowship’ (do¯bo¯ shakai); see Ama, op. cit., p. 38 n. 7.
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which, he asserts, will allow us to rise above the ‘struggle for existence’ and provide the
foundation for personal and social transformation: ‘Inasmuch as this is what the nembutsu
signifies, we must proceed from the spiritual realm and completely change the social system
from the ground up. I am firmly convinced that this is what socialism means’.37 Ultimately,
Takagi’s Buddhist socialism, in its emphasis on personal transformation as the basis of
social change, shares less in common with Marxist traditions than with the ideas of Leo
Tolstoy (despite Takagi’s opening disclaimer) and Oscar Wilde, and also with contempor-
ary Engaged Buddhists such as Thich Nhat Hanh.38
Finally, like his New Buddhist peers, Takagi was quite willing to criticise the institutional
Buddhist leaders of his day, though with the additional risk of being himself part of the very
institution he was criticising. For instance, in Yo ga shakaishugi, he chastises Dr. Nanjo¯
Bun’yu¯ (1849–1927), Shin scholar, priest and, from 1903, president of O¯tani University,
for encouraging his listeners to be fearless in attacking their enemies, since ‘if you die,
you will go to the Pure Land’. This, Takagi asserts, is an appeal to feelings of hostility,
and one that is used to promote violence – both of which go against the Shin emphasis
on compassion.39 Later on, he returns to this theme: ‘We cannot help but lament when
we hear that religious functionaries are praying to gods and Buddhas for victory . . .
Cease taking pleasure in victory and shouting “banzai”. This is because “Namu Amida
Butsu” is the voice that leads everyone equally to salvation’.40 It is worth noting that
Nanjo¯, the target of Takagi’s critique, is perhaps best known for being one of the first
two Japanese Buddhist monks chosen by Shimaji Mokurai and O¯tani Ko¯ei to travel to
Europe with the explicit purpose of studying buddhology – i.e., to use modern, Western
methods of scholarship to fully understand and ‘reform’ Buddhism at home.41 To this
end, Nanjo¯ had joined with Murakami Sensho¯ and Kiyozawa Manshi to form the Shira-
kawa Party, whose task was to overhaul the Higashi Honganji sect administration.42 In
addition to this cosmopolitan, reformist pedigree, however, Nanjo¯ was also in his youth
a foot soldier in a Buddhist military unit known as the So¯heitai or Warrior Priest Force,
which fought in the battles leading up to the 1868 Restoration.43
There is little question that Takagi Kenmyo¯ is a significant early voice in Buddhist social-
ism in Japan. He takes the reformist ideas of the mid-Meiji period Buddhist Enlightenment
figures and New Buddhists and strives to embed them more fully into action towards social
reform, without losing the religious principles – in this case, decidedly Shin sect principles
– on which he stands. And yet, for all this, there is a certain whiff of utopianism in Takagi’s
work. Despite the fact that he pushes beyond Kiyozawa’s call for a ‘Buddhist country’ by
applying Shin principles of equality and compassion to problems like the burakumin,
state prostitution and imperialist warfare, Takagi’s conflation of the Pure Land of Bliss
with a socialist realm simply opens up the problem of how to bring about the large-scale
social transformations that may be necessary to reach his stated goals of ‘progress’ and
‘community’ – defined by Ama Toshimaru as ‘realizing peace through thoroughgoing
opposition to war and elimination of social inequality and discrimination [while bringing
37Takagi, op. cit., p. 60.
38See Leo N. Tolstoy, Government is Violence: Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism, edited by David Stephens (London:
Phoenix Press, 1990); Oscar Wilde, ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’ in The Soul of Man Under Socialism and
Selected Critical Prose (London: Penguin, 2001); Thich Nhat Hanh, Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Bud-
dhism (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1998).
39Takagi, op. cit., p. 56.
40Takagi, op. cit., p. 59.
41See Ketelaar, op. cit., p. 126.
42Ama Michihiro, op. cit., p. 26.
43See Ketelaar, op. cit., p. 249 n. 67.
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about a] life free from the “struggle for existence”, where labor is used only for producing
sustenance so that the cultivation of one’s spiritual life can be actualized without any pro-
blems’.44 The question remains: Will the nembutsu really be enough to accomplish this?
Uchiyama Gudo¯: Self-Awakening to Comfort and Freedom
Of all the radical Buddhists of the pre-war era, So¯to¯ Zen priest Uchiyama Gudo¯ is probably
the best known in the West, not least because he is discussed as the most striking exception
to the rule of Zen collaboration with twentieth-century militarism in Brian Victoria’s Zen at
War (1997).45 Among Japanese scholars, too, Gudo¯’s case has long fascinated, due both to
its tragic ending and, one suspects, to the character of the protagonist, who seemed dispo-
sitionally suited to the role of heroic martyr.46
Born 17 May 1874 in the village of Ojiya, Niigata prefecture, in his youth Gudo¯ appren-
ticed to his father as a carver of wooden statues, including Buddha statues and family altars.
A bright student, he showed an early indication of his later political leanings by identifying
strongly with the semi-legendary tale of Sakura So¯go¯ro (aka So¯go-sama, 1605–1653), a
gimin (martyr) of the early Edo period who was executed after appealing to the sho¯gun
for help to ease the hardship of the peasants in his village. Indeed, the area in which
Gudo¯ was raised (former Echigo province) had long experience of rural poverty, as well
as a deeply engrained tradition of peasant revolt.47 Upon the death of his father in 1890,
Gudo¯ set off on a series of travels throughout the country, looking to further his education,
which had been cut off at the elementary level. He spent some time in Tokyo, where he may
have stayed at the house of Inoue Enryo¯ (1858–1919), the Meiji Buddhist Enlightenment
reformer who was a distant relative of Gudo¯’s mother. Unfortunately, we do not have any
concrete evidence for this connection, but the possibility is intriguing, especially when we
look at Uchiyama’s later turn towards Buddhist reform.48 If Gudo¯ did stay with Inoue in
the early 1890s, this would have been a peak of Inoue’s own work, both theoretical and
practical. Was it Inoue who sparked Gudo¯’s radicalism? If so, the student certainly went
beyond the master.
Ordained as a So¯to¯ Zen monk in 1897, Gudo¯ achieved the rank of abbot in 1904 at the
age of 29, taking up the position of head monk at Rinsenji, a temple in the mountains of
Hakone, Kanagawa prefecture. Once established, Gudo¯ immediately set to work giving
assistance to his parishioners, most of whom were poor. He also began to develop his
ideas about Buddhist social organisation, looking back to the Chinese sangha as a model
of simplicity and communal lifestyle. Around the same time, Gudo¯ came into contact
44Ama Toshimaru, op. cit., p. 50.
45See Victoria, Zen at War, chapter 3: ‘Uchiyama Gudo¯: Radical Soto Zen Priest’, pp. 38–48; see also Ishikawa,
‘Two So¯to¯ Zen Monks’, for a treatment of Gudo¯ and the nationalist So¯to¯ Zen priest Takeda Hanshi (1864–1911).
46See, e.g., Yoshida Kyu¯ichi, ‘Uchiyama Gudo¯ to Takagi Kenmyo¯ no chosaku’, Nihon rekishi 131 (1959), pp. 68–
77; Inagaki Masami, Kindai Bukkyo¯ no Henkaku-sha (Tokyo: Daizo¯ Shuppan, 1975); Kashiwagi Ryu¯ho¯, Taigyaku-
jiken to Uchiyama Gudo¯ (Tokyo, 1979); Morinaga Eizaburo¯, Uchiyama Gudo¯ (Tokyo: Ronso¯sha, 1984); Yoshida
Kyu¯ichi, Nihon kindai bukkyo¯shi kenkyu¯ (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1992), pp. 402–408.
47According to the collective research and statistical work of Aoki Ko¯ji, Yokoyama Toshio, and Yamanaka Kiyo-
taka, Echigo was one of only six provinces (out of 71) to experience more than 100 ikki (armed peasant revolts)
between 1590 and 1867. As Bix notes, memories of this legacy ran deep within the collective cultural bloodstream:
‘The traditions and practice of dramatic human sacrifice, of people victimised on behalf of their village commu-
nities, helped peasants realise the righteousness of their cause and sustained them in pursuing it’ (Bix, op. cit., pp.
xxiv–xxv).
48Ishikawa notes, in particular, the ‘germination of the idea of the “self” of “self-awakening”’ in Gudo¯’s Heibon no
jikaku (Ordinary Self-Awakening), which may have come from Inoue; Ishikawa, op. cit., p. 99.
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with the anarchist and socialist ideas, which were beginning to spread on the eve of the
Russo-Japanese war. In particular, Gudo¯ was inspired by the ideology of the left-wing
Heimin Shimbun, to which he contributed his own declaration of principles in a piece
entitled ‘How did I become a socialist?’ published in the 17 January 1904 issue. In this
brief piece, citing various Buddhist texts, including the Diamond Sutra and Lotus Sutra,
Gudo¯ insists on a fundamental link between (Maha¯ya¯na) Buddhist teachings and socialism.
Through his contact with Heimin Shimbun and his acquaintance with Dr. Kato¯ Tokijiro¯
(1858–1930), Gudo¯ was introduced to leading socialists Ko¯toku Shusui and Sakai Toshi-
hiko. Facing pressure from the government crackdown on left-wing movements following
the Red Flag Incident of June 1908, Gudo¯ purchased equipment in order to set up his own
underground press within Rinsenji (literally, under the shumidan altar), on which he pro-
duced socialist pamphlets and tracts, in addition to his own writings. As a result, in May
1909 he was arrested for violating publication laws, and, upon a search of Rinsenji,
police claimed to have discovered a cache of materials used to make explosive devices.
Implicated, along with 22 others, in the High Treason Incident, Gudo¯ was convicted and
executed on 24 January 1911. According to witnesses, he was serene and even smiling as
he climbed the scaffold.
As with Takagi Kenmyo¯, Gudo¯’s priestly status was rescinded by the So¯to¯ Zen leadership in
June 1910, five months after his death, and the sect took great pains to distance themselves
from Gudo¯ and his ideas, organising a series of meetings in the months following the rene-
gade priest’s death in which over 100 So¯to¯ sect leaders, government administrators and pro-
minent intellectuals (including Inoue Tetsujiro¯) denounced the man and his work, pledging
themselves to the principle of ‘revere the Emperor, protect the nation’ (sonno¯ gokoku).49 Also
like the case of Takagi, this decision was eventually reversed and an apology issued by the
organisation – albeit not until eight decades later, in 1993. According to the official
announcement: ‘when viewed by today’s standards of respect for human rights, Uchiyama
Gudo¯’s writings contain elements that should be regarded as farsighted’ and ‘the sect’s
actions strongly aligned the sect with an establishment dominated by the emperor system.
They were not designed to protect the unique Buddhist character of the sect’s priests’.
Unlike the case of Higashi Honganji reversal on Takagi Kenmyo¯, however, the So¯to¯ Zen
sect have not gone so far as to dedicate themselves to carrying out Gudo¯’s work.
What was it that made Gudo¯ such a threat? As Victoria notes, of all four priests convicted
in the High Treason Incident, Gudo¯ was the most actively involved in ‘subversive’ (i.e., social-
ist and anti-governmental) activities; thus his punishment was harsher than the others. More-
over, he left behind more writings on his beliefs than did the other three. And yet:
[E]ven Gudo¯’s writings contain little that directly addresses the relationship he
saw between the Law of the Buddha and his own social activism. This is not sur-
prising, since neither he nor the other three priests claimed to be Buddhist scho-
lars or possess special expertise in either Buddhist doctrine or social, political, or
economic theory. They might be best described as social activists who, based on
their Buddhist faith, were attempting to alleviate the mental and physical suffering
they saw around them, especially in Japan’s impoverished areas.50
While it is certainly true that Gudo¯ and Takagi were not scholars of Buddhism (nor of
sociology, politics or economic theory, for that matter), I suggest that there is more to the
thought of these radical Buddhists than scholars such as Victoria suggest. Yes, they were
49Ibid., pp. 102–103.
50Victoria, Zen at War, p. 39.
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activists first, theorists second – but they also struggled, as did their New Buddhist peers
and later Buddhist socialists – to establish doctrinal links and reinterpretations of Buddhist
teachings to suit the needs of their times, as they envisioned them.51 We have seen this
already in the work of Takagi Kenmyo¯. In what follows, I would like to analyse in more
detail the theoretical work of Uchiyama Gudo¯, by examining two representative works:
In Commemoration of Imprisonment: Anarcho-communist Revolution (Nyu¯goku kinen
museifu kyo¯san kakumei) and Ordinary Self-Awakening (Heibon no jikaku).
Anarcho-communist Revolution was the first piece published on Gudo¯’s secret press. A
16-page pamphlet, it provides a fairly clear statement of his central principles at the time
(June 1908). Gudo¯ made 1000 copies, which were distributed throughout Japan. Eventually
this piece, more than any other, would lead to Gudo¯’s arrest and implication in the High
Treason Incident. Indeed, in one of the preliminary hearings after Gudo¯’s arrest Anarcho-
communist Revolution was called ‘the most evil writing since the beginning of Japanese
history’! In any case, this was the work that would eventually lead to Gudo¯’s incarceration
and death, since it apparently inspired Miyashita Takichi (1875–1911), one of the apparent
ringleaders, to carry out his plot.52 The primary theme is, like many of Gudo¯’s works, the
problem of rural poverty, and thus the author is led fairly quickly into a scathing critique of
the (capitalist?) system that allows for a very few to monopolise the labour of the vast
majority, who work with no hope of reward. The subtitle of the work – Kosakunin wa
naze kurushiika (Why Do Tenant Farmers Suffer?) – indicates the implicit connections
between Gudo¯’s chosen theme and his Buddhist commitments. As a Buddhist, he seeks
the causes and conditions of suffering, in order to eliminate them by whatever means
necessary. Marius Jansen gives the following account of the conditions of a typical
tenant farmer during the Edo period, conditions that had changed little by Gudo¯’s time:
The tenant . . . shared few of the public rights and the duties of his landlord, and
he lived under severe economic dependence. His plot was usually too small to give
him the opportunity of accumulating anything, and the house in which he lived,
and the tools he used, were probably not his own. Paternalism, vital for his life,
was expressed in language, deportment, and deference summed up in his status
as mizunomi, or ‘water drinking’, farmer. The landlord was his ‘parent person’,
oya-kata, and he the landlord’s kokata or child.53
Here we see that the suffering of tenant farmers was both material and also psychological
– as they were reduced to the position of almost total dependence on their oyakata.54 Yet,
while Gudo¯ was an advocate of land reform, ‘reform’ alone would not be enough to solve
the dire problem of rural penury: decisive actions must be taken by the oppressed them-
selves, in order to cut off the source of suffering at its roots. To this end, Gudo¯ advises
tenant farmers to resist by refusing to deliver rice and stop paying taxes. But he does not
stop there. Later in the essay, the author recommends that farmers refuse military conscrip-
tion and encourages them to denounce the emperor system, based as it is on a ‘superstition’
rooted in ‘mistaken ideas’. Although Gudo¯ makes no direct reference in this pamphlet to
51Whereas Victoria’s remarks come across as somewhat dismissive of the intellectual work of these activist monks,
Yoshida Kyu¯’ichi goes to the other extreme, proclaiming that, ‘Uchiyama Gudo¯ was not a thinker like Ko¯toku
[Shu¯sui]. His socialist and anarchist ideas emerged from his experience’ (Yoshida, Nihon kindai bukkyo¯shi,
p. 402). Here Gudo¯ is presented as a something more than ‘merely’ an armchair radical.
52Ishikawa, op. cit., p. 102.
53Jansen, op. cit., p. 114.
54Bix notes the increase in the power of landlord families over tenants throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, citing it as the primary reason for the growth of peasant riots during the same period; Bix, op. cit., p. xx.
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any specific Buddhist text or doctrine, we can interpret Buddhist connections from several
of his expressions and ideas. Perhaps the most conspicuous of these is the unusual phrase
anraku jiyu¯, which appears at several key points in the piece, and may be understood as a
motto for Gudo¯’s Buddhist-socialist vision.
Recall that the Buddhist socialism of Takagi Kenmyo¯ was self-consciously sectarian, in
the sense that he rooted his socialist convictions in principles and doctrines specific to
the Shin Pure Land sect. What, if anything, can we find in Gudo¯’s vision that is specifically
Zen, as opposed to more generally Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist? Is there any evidence that Gudo¯
saw Zen as particularly well suited to anarcho-communism? We have noted above the
various catchphrases invoked by Gudo¯ to draw the bridge between Buddhism and social-
ism, and that they are all doctrines rooted in the early Maha¯ya¯na texts, and thus to a large
degree foundational for all East Asian Buddhist sects. If we were to choose a single text that
brings together these themes, it would be the Lotus Sutra – a text that, while foundational to
several East Asian schools such as Tiantai/Tendai and Nichiren, is also deeply respected
within other Maha¯ya¯na streams, including Zen. Thus, while we might argue that Gudo¯’s
vision is one with roots in Zen doctrine, we would have to admit that it is not by any
means a vision exclusive to Zen (unlike that of Takagi, which does seem exclusive to
Shin or Pure Land teachings).55 Indeed, in several important respects – including,
perhaps, a willingness to engage in violent revolution – Gudo¯’s ‘anarcho-communism’
has much in common with the Zen-Nichiren ultra-nationalism put forth two decades
later by Inoue Nissho¯ (1887–1967). At any rate, though it would remain loosely defined
from its first appearance as a concept in late Meiji through the 1920s, the appeal of anar-
chism, as opposed Marxism or other forms of socialism, was (1) its focus on individual
freedom and liberty from all constraints – moral or political; and (2) its emphasis on
‘direct action’ – as opposed to social reform.56 Though it requires some measure of inter-
pretive verve (or deliberate misreading), one can see how a Buddhist – and particularly Zen
– case could be made for these priorities as well.
At the same time, Gudo¯’s vision for a better world is one that is also heavily informed by
the monastic tradition – specifically, the simple and communal life of the (ideal) monas-
tery. Here again, we could argue that the monastic ideal is shared by virtually all forms of
Buddhism, but it appears that Gudo¯’s inspiration was the Chinese Chan tradition(s) that
gave birth to Japanese Zen. Around the time he became an abbot, in 1904, Gudo¯ avers:
I reflected on the way in which priests of my sect had undergone religious training
in China in former times [and] I realized how beautiful it had been. Here were two
or three hundred persons who, living in one place at one time, shared a communal
lifestyle in which they wore the same clothing and ate the same food. I held to the
ideal that if this could be applied to one village, one county, or one country, what
an extremely good system would be created.57
55On this issue, Yoshida argues that both Gudo¯ and Ito¯ Shoshin (1876–1963) shared a fundamental belief in the
difference between ‘the way of original Buddhism’ (bukkyo¯ honrai no michi) and the forms of sectarian Buddhism
existent in Meiji Japan (Yoshida, Nihon kindai bukkyo¯shi, p. 406).
56Interestingly, Gudo¯ seems to have arrived at his preference for anarchism prior to Ko¯toku Shu¯sui’s famous
lecture at Kinkikan Hall in Kanda, Tokyo, on 28 June 1906, entitled ‘The Tide of the World Revolutionary Move-
ment’ (Sekai kakumei undo¯ no cho¯ryu¯) in which the founder of the Heimin-sha announced his break with social
democratic (i.e., parliamentary) tactics in favour of revolutionary syndicalism, effecting an irrevocable split in
Japan’s young socialist movement; see Notehelfer, op. cit., pp. 133–137.
57Inagaki, op. cit., pp. 112–113; translation is from Victoria, Zen at War, pp. 40–41, with minor modifications by
me.
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As Inagaki notes, Gudo¯’s insight into the fundamental similarity between the idealised Bud-
dhist sangha – rooted in dedication to simple, communal living and, most significantly, a
rejection of private property – and the basic assumptions of socialism, was one that would
not appear again within Japanese Buddhist thought for another nearly three decades, in the
work of Seno’o Giro¯ and the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism.58
Gudo¯’s Ordinary Self-awakening is somewhat different in both style and content from
Anarcho-communist Revolution. Here the rhetoric is turned down considerably, and
Gudo¯ makes a logical case for freedom and democracy using the leitmotif of jikaku.
While this term can be fairly literally translated into English as ‘self-awareness’ or ‘self-con-
sciousness’, it also has deep Buddhist roots and associations as a synonym for terms like
nirvana, bodhi and satori. Thus I have chosen to render it as ‘self-awakening’. It seems
that Gudo¯ intends to use the term in both its Buddhist and its ‘Western’ or perhaps phi-
losophical (but also political) sense. As with his use of the compound anraku jiyu¯ in
Anarcho-communist Revolution, the term jikaku in this piece implies both a Buddhist awa-
kening (i.e., an existential awareness that entails a fundamental personal transformation
and encompasses or leads to liberation from suffering) and the more overtly Western phi-
losophical sense of gaining ‘autonomy’ (and political ‘freedom’) through liberation from
the constraints of tradition, authority and personal ignorance. Reading this piece, in its
emphasis on ‘freedom’, the libertarian aspect of Gudo¯’s vision becomes apparent, and
we can see why he identified with anarchism as much as communism as a political
ideal.59 While communal living and the abandonment of private property remain a
future ideal, Gudo¯’s immediate concern was the destruction of the semi-feudal system
that denied farmers the use of what is theirs by ‘natural right’ (to¯zen no kenri). Thus, Ordin-
ary Self-awakening reads as much like a work by John Locke or Thomas Paine – or Japanese
Enlightenment figure Fukuzawa Yukichi – as of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels.
Finally, let us return to Gudo¯’s declaration, published in the 17 January 1904 edition of
the Heimin Shimbun, which, however brief, is his clearest expression of the link between
classical Buddhist teachings and contemporary left-wing politics. Here is the declaration
in its entirety:
As a propagator of Buddhism I teach that ‘all sentient beings possess Buddha
nature’ [issai shujo¯ shitsu¯ bussho¯] and that ‘within this Dharma there is equality,
with neither superior nor inferior’ [kore ho¯ byo¯do¯ mu ko¯ge]. Furthermore, I
teach that ‘all sentient beings are my children’ [issai shujo¯ mina kore ako].
Having taken these golden words as the basis of my faith, I discovered that they
are in complete agreement with the principles of socialism. It was thus that I
became a believer in socialism.60
Gudo¯ cites three well-known phrases from the Maha¯ya¯na sutras: (1) issai shujo¯
shitsu¯ bussho¯ can found in many Maha¯ya¯na texts, including both the Nirvana61
and Lotus62 sutras; (2) kore ho¯ byo¯do¯ mu ko¯ge is taken directly from the Diamond
58Inagaki, op. cit., p. 113.
59Although it is often said that Gudo¯, following the lead of Ko¯toku Shu¯sui and Sakai Toshihiko, abandoned social-
ism for anarchism, in fact he never makes a clear theoretical distinction between anarchism, socialism, or com-
munism – just as he never makes a clear distinction between Buddhism and these economic and political
theories; see Yoshida, Nihon kindai bukkyo¯shi, p. 405.
60Originally published in Heimin Shimbun 10 (17 January 1904); reprinted in Kashiwagi, op. cit., p. 29; translation
taken from Victoria, op. cit., with my modifications.
61T0374.12.0402c08–09.
62See, e.g. T1723.34.0656a19.
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Sutra,63 though the more common version by far is kore ho¯ byo¯do¯ muyu¯ ko¯ge64 – while the
even more common shorter phrase ho¯ byo¯do¯ refers to ‘the sameness of truth as taught by all
buddhas’ (Sk. dharma-samata¯), giving the term a nuance quite distinct from Gudo¯’s overtly
‘political’ interpretation; while (3) issai shujo¯ mina kore ako, though less common, can be
found in the Lotus Sutra,65 among other texts. Of course, the speaker here is S´a¯kyamuni
Buddha, and not, as Gudo¯ seems to imply, an ordinary monk (though one might argue,
Nichiren-like, that an aspirant bodhisattva must take on this aspect of the Buddha as
part of his/her vow).
Here we see Gudo¯ seeking Buddhist foundations for equality in the early (and controver-
sial) Maha¯ya¯na teaching of Buddha nature, which, via Tiantai/Tendai, would eventually
provide a shared foundation for virtually all East Asian Buddhist sects, including Zen,
Pure Land (both Jo¯do and Shin) and Nichiren. While it remains something of an open
question as to whether the doctrine of Buddha nature can provide a sure foundation for
a modern Buddhist conception of social and political equality, this is certainly a feature
of East Asian Maha¯ya¯na teachings that has been upheld by socially engaged Buddhists in
recent decades.66 Working against the egalitarian interpretation favoured by Gudo¯ and
socially engaged Buddhists, however, is the question of to which ‘realm’ these statements
apply – a query that brings us back to our previous discussion of the Takagi Kenmyo¯’s
rejection of the Pure Land ‘two truths doctrine’. For instance, the well-known teaching
of shabetsu byo¯do¯ or shabetsu soku byo¯do¯ – usually translated as ‘differentiation is equality’
– was taken by prominent Meiji Buddhist figures like Shimaji Mokurai (see above) to imply
that distinctions in social status and wealth are simply natural givens like age, sex, and so
on, and have nothing whatsoever to do with the fundamental equality of the ‘absolute’
realm.
In short, rather than try to resolve the ‘problem’ of inequality in the here and now, Bud-
dhists – according to Shimaji and others of his ilk – must focus rather on reaching the
realm of undifferentiated being, by which all such superficial distinctions are recognised
as illusory. Thus socialists, whether of the revolutionary or reformist hue, are mistaken
in taking the material (i.e., contingent) world to be the fundamental reality – missing
the forest for the trees, as it were.67 Of course, Gudo¯, like most other Buddhist progressives
and radicals, might turn this around and ask Shimaji and company why they are fixated on
establishing a duality between this world and some other – what Ketelaar has termed ‘the
bifurcation of form [yu¯kei] and formless [mukei]’ – when in fact no ‘ultimate’ distinction
can be made.68 As most Nichirenists and many Shin and Zen followers would have it, the
world in which we live and suffer is nothing less than the ‘transcendent’ realm in its imper-
fect, ‘unawakened’ state. The fundamental or ‘transcendent’ equality asserted in the
Maha¯ya¯na sutras is a for Gudo¯ a call to action – to bring about the transformation of
63T1701.33.0167a09.
64See, e.g., T0235.08.0751c24.
65T1716.33.0698a17.
66See, e.g., Sallie King, who argues against the Critical Buddhists that Buddha nature is both ‘impeccably Buddhist’
and useful as a foundation for Engaged Buddhism (‘The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature is Impeccably Buddhist’, in
Paul L. Swanson and Jamie Hubbard (eds), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997); also Sallie King, Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991). Ishikawa notes the
similarities between Gudo¯ and Dr B.R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) on the issue of employing Buddhist teachings to
battle discrimination and promote social equality, as well as the struggle to connect Marxism and Buddhism (Ishi-
kawa, op. cit., p. 100).
67Shimaji Mokurai, Shimaji Mokurai zenshu¯, volume 3 (Kyoto: Honganji Shuppan, 1973), pp. 285–296.
68Ketelaar, op. cit., p. 134; Ketelaar argues that this bifurcation became ‘a dominant theoretical position of late-
nineteenth-century Buddhist thought’. I concur, with the caveat that this paradigm would persist in much of twen-
tieth-century Buddhist thought, as well, including the work of the primary figures of the Kyoto School.
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this world of inequality and suffering into a perfected ‘Buddha land’ in which there is
‘comfort and freedom’ (anraku jiyu¯). After all, the key here for Gudo¯ is the logical chain
that: (1) suffering exists in this world; (2) social inequality is a primary cause for suffering
and thus must be eliminated; and (3) in order to eliminate social inequality, the system that
creates such inequality must be replaced – even at the risk of one’s life.
Conclusions
Uchiyama Gudo¯’s concern with preserving individual liberty against the economic and
political control of the elites (including, but not limited to, the ‘thief in chief’ – the
Emperor) reflects to some degree his anarchist-libertarian leanings, but also tells us some-
thing about the way ‘socialism’ more generally was conceived in Japan at this relatively
early stage, by its supporters as well as its detractors. As we have seen, government oppo-
sition to socialism was rooted not simply in fear of chaos but also in the perception of
socialism as foreign, individualistic, and materialistic. Already by the late Meiji period,
kokutai ideology was promoting an organic state with deep ‘historical’ roots in the imper-
ial line and associated myths. Thus the main opposition to socialism, beyond it simply
being a foreign import, was that it was unsuited to the constitution (in the metaphorical
but also literal sense!) of the Japanese people. On the other hand, while a number of self-
proclaimed socialists (or anarcho-communists) like Gudo¯ were self-consciously promot-
ing liberal ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’, others felt more keenly the weight of the above critique
and sought to ground their vision of ‘socialism’ more deeply in Japanese history and
‘values’. Thus we have early socialists like Abe Iso’o (1865–1949) writing that ‘an accurate
account of the development of socialism in Japan entails going back to the early days of
our history and examining the principles which influenced our sovereigns in governing
their people in those far-off times’.69 Moreover, at one of the earliest mass demon-
strations of workers, held in the Muko¯jima district of Tokyo on 3 April 1901, at
which 20,000 people defied a police ban on large public assemblies to pass a series of res-
olutions for labour legislation and extension of the suffrage, the meeting opened with a
pledge of allegiance to ‘His Majesty the Emperor’, only to conclude with a rousing chorus
of ‘banzai!’70
As contradictory as such statements may sound, they alerts us to several important facts
discussed in this essay: (1) the definition of ‘socialism’ is more fluid than we (including
many scholars) tend to assume; (2) this is perhaps even more so in late Meiji Japan,
when various key texts remained untranslated, and when various permutations of left-
wing thought were arriving in Japan simultaneously (allowing for an interesting historical
parallel to the arrival of Buddhism in Japan some 14 centuries earlier).71
69Abe Iso’o, ‘Socialism in Japan’, In Shigenobu O¯kuma (ed.) Fifty Years of New Japan, vol. 2 (London: Smith, Eldeb
& Co., 1909), p. 494; also see Crump, who all too readily dismisses such claims as ‘bizarre’; John Crump, The
Origin of Socialist Thought in Japan (New York: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 29. Although he avoids the term ‘social-
ism’, well-known pre- and postwar Buddhist historian Tsuji Zennosuke writes of the ‘social welfare’ foundations of
the imperial state – and thus of the Japanese as a whole – in several books translated into English by the Japanese
Red Cross society in the early 1930s (and thus presumably for foreign consumption); see Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon-
jin no Hakuai. Tokyo: Kinko¯do¯ Shoseki, 1932; republished together with Nihon Ko¯shitsu no Shakai Jigyo¯ in 1934.
70See Crump, op. cit., p. 24.
71Along these lines, just as they have always been scholars who question the ‘authenticity’ of the transmission of
Buddhism to Japan (or, more recently, to the United States), so too we encounter scholars who question the legiti-
macy of Japanese socialism; Crump, a self-proclaimed ‘real socialist’, stands at the forefront of these; Crump op.
cit., pp. xi–xii.
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